. The Regulation No. 12-1996 (thereafter "the Regulation") imposes penalties on firms whose IPO earnings forecasts are significantly overestimated in their IPO prospectuses.
Introduction
Management earnings forecasts contained in prospectuses for initial public offerings (IPOs) provide useful information about future firm performance. However, IPO earnings forecasts are vulnerable to information asymmetry problems because information about an IPO firm is less available to the public than information about a listed firm, and management always have better knowledge about their firm's future performance than outside investors.
Moreover, the credibility of IPO earnings forecasts may be impaired by managerial opportunism. For instance, management may have incentives to overestimate IPO earnings forecasts in order to raise more proceeds from the IPO. A significant overestimation of IPO earnings forecasts may mislead investors, and is usually associated with an adverse market reaction and a potential legal liability. Consequently, the credibility of IPO earnings forecasts is a topic of considerable interest to researchers, investors, and regulators.
Research into the reliability of management earnings forecasts in the U.S. started in early 1970s. However, IPO earnings forecasts are hardly ever addressed in U.S. studies because earnings forecasts are rarely disclosed in U.S. IPO prospectuses. 1 Most of prior research on IPO earnings forecasts uses data from British Commonwealth countries (Jelic, Saadouni, & Briston, 1998) . So far, fewer studies on management forecast reliability have been conducted for emerging markets, especially for China. This study provides evidence on the reliability of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts. We find that the mean forecast error and 1 See McDonald (1973) , Imhoff (1978) , Jaggi (1980) , Porter (1982) , and Cameron (1982) .
the mean absolute forecast error are 0.45% and 15.28%, respectively, for a sample of 858
Chinese IPOs over the period 1991 to 2005.
2
On December 26, 1996, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC) promulgated a regulation, Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares (No. 12-1996) . The Regulation No. 12-1996 (thereafter "the Regulation") imposes penalties on firms whose IPO earnings forecasts are significantly overestimated in their IPO prospectuses.
Specifically, the Regulation requires that IPO firms and their auditors must explain and apologize to the public in a CSRC designated newspaper if predicted earnings are overestimated by 10 -20% compared to actual earnings. IPO firms will be penalized if earnings forecasts are overestimated by more than 20% and the overestimation is deemed to be a fraudulent activity. Auditors will also be penalized if they issue an inappropriate audit opinion on a client company's IPO earnings forecasts. The Regulation also prohibits IPO firms from using earnings forecasts as a basis for setting issuance price.
Although the Regulation was promulgated to improve the reliability of earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses, it remains an empirical question because the legal enforcement infrastructure is weak in China. Moreover, Chinese IPO firms are closely connected with the government, which may provide opportunities for them to override the Regulation. Hence, whether the Regulation can enhance the reliability of earnings forecasts is an empirical question. This study examines whether the Regulation has achieved its initial 2 IPO earnings forecasts from some Commonwealth countries seem less accurate than Chinese IPO earnings forecasts. For example, the mean absolute forecast error is 289% for the Australian forecasts (Hartnett, 1993) , 100% for the New Zealand forecasts (Mak, 1989) , and 88% for the Canadian forecasts (Pedwell, Warsame, & Neu, 1994) .
objective. We find that the Regulation has been efficacious in reducing the overestimation of IPO earnings forecasts after it was promulgated on December 26, 1996. We also document a significant improvement in earnings forecast accuracy resulting from the promulgation of the Regulation.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate whether a securities regulation in an emerging market can enhance the reliability of corporate financial disclosure. Since there is rare research into the effects of securities regulations on corporate disclosure, the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 provides us an opportunity to enrich this research topic.
Second, we document evidence on the efficacy of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996. Our findings may provide implications for future regulation promulgation to the CSRC and other securities regulators of emerging markets. Third, this study adds to prior research on the economic determinants of forecast accuracy. Our study suggests some ex ante criteria for evaluating Chinese earnings forecast accuracy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces institutional background. The third section develops hypotheses. Section 4 discusses research design.
Section 5 provides empirical results, Section 6 conducts additional analyses, and the paper concludes in the seventh section.
Institutional Background

Corporate disclosure in Chinese IPO prospectuses
The See Qi, Wu, and Zhang (1998) .
Hypotheses Development
Effective on December 26, 1996, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 was formulated because Chinese securities administrators were seriously concerned with the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts. Under the Regulation, IPO firms are not allowed to use earnings forecasts as a basis for setting issuance price. Moreover, any significant and opportunistic overestimation of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses will be penalized by the CSRC.
The Regulation may influence both the benefits and the costs of overstating earnings forecasts. Before the Regulation, earnings forecasts were allowed for setting issuance price.
Hence, if earnings forecasts were overstated, the issuance price would also be exaggerated.
The Regulation prohibits IPO firms from using earnings forecasts as a basis for determining issuance prices, thus reduces the instant benefits of overestimating earnings forecasts.
The Regulation also increases the potential costs of overestimating earnings forecasts in at least three ways. First, any penalty from the CSRC will lower the reputation of an IPO firm and its auditor, especially as the penalty is publicly announced. Second, the stock markets will react adversely if an IPO firm is penalized for overstating earnings forecasts. A decline in stock price will consequently reduce the wealth of a large number of shares owned by the management of the firm. Further, it will be more difficult to obtain approval for seasoned equity offerings from the CSRC if a firm had once been penalized for a fraud.
Seasoned equity offerings may be an important tunnel for Chinese listed firms to survive when incurring significant operating losses. Overall, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 increases the costs and decreases the benefits of overstating earnings forecasts, and thus may mitigate opportunistic overestimation of earnings forecasts and enhance the reliability of the forecasts.
However, prior research shows that legal enforcement is different across countries (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silances, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) . In countries with weak enforcement environments, a regulation may not be strictly enforced even though the regulation itself is well designed, and consequently, may not meet its initial objective.
Moreover, Cai (2007, pp.7) argues that "the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC), the executive branch body that is responsible for enforcing the securities law, has also not proven to be effective, independent, or professional based upon international standards". Thus, the weak legal enforcement infrastructure in China may impair the efficacy of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996.
Prior research also suggests that political connections may relax regulatory oversight of a company in question (Faccio, 2006) . Politically connected firms are more likely to obtain assistance from the government (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006) . Most of Chinese IPO companies were state-owned enterprises before they went public, and the majority of their shares are still owned by the government after initial public offerings. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) further find that about 27% of CEOs from a sample of 790 Chinese IPO firms are former or current government bureaucrats. Overall, Chinese IPO firms are closely connected with the government, and thus may take advantage of the affiliated relationship to challenge the authority of the CSRC, a regulatory body that is also highly affiliated with the government. Thus, the effectiveness of the CSRC regulation is questionable considering the prevalence of political connections between Chinese IPO firms and the government.
In summary, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 may increase the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts as the costs (benefits) of opportunistic overestimation will be higher (lower). However, the positive impact of the regulation on forecast reliability might be attenuated due to the weak legal enforcement infrastructure and the solid political connections between IPO firms and the government. Thus, whether the CSRC Regulation
No. 12-1996 can enhance the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts is still an empirical question. Based on the above discussions, we develop two hypotheses with regard to forecast bias and forecast accuracy, respectively: H1
IPO earnings forecasts have been less optimistic after the promulgation of the
Regulation than before.
H2
IPO earnings forecasts have been more accurate after the promulgation of the
Research Design
Sample selection
The sample of this study includes all Chinese IPOs over the period 1991 to 2005 that satisfy the following criteria:
(1) IPO prospectuses are available on www.cnlist.com, a Chinese website that provides all information disclosed by Chinese listed companies, Although the income tax rate is 33% for all non-public Chinese companies, it is not uniform and is determined by local tax authority after a firm is publicly listed. The annual profit for the IPO year may be taxed on a post-IPO rate for the whole year, or be taxed on a pre-IPO rate for the pre-IPO period and on a post-IPO (4) Other data are available for analysis.
Insert Table 1 
Univariate analysis
The reliability of earnings forecasts can be decomposed into a bias component and an accuracy component. Forecast bias for an IPO firm is measured by forecast error (FE), which is commonly defined as follows:
where F = earnings forecast for the IPO year, A = actual earnings for the IPO year.
We focus on earnings forecasts for the IPO year because many IPO firms did not issue forecasts for years after the IPO year. A negative (positive) sign of FE indicates that earnings forecasts are overestimated (underestimated) for an IPO firm. However, the average forecast error across firms may not accurately reflect the average size of forecast errors because negative and positive errors cancel each other out.
Following prior research, forecast accuracy for an IPO firm is measured by absolute forecast error (AFE), that is,
Earnings forecasts with lower AFE are more accurate than forecasts with higher AFE.
We first conduct univariate analysis to test the two hypotheses about the effects of the significantly affected by the Regulation, the two hypotheses will not be statistically rejected.
The two hypotheses are also tested by conducting regression analysis as described in the next subsection.
Regression analysis
We run the following pooled regression to test the two hypotheses after controlling for several factors that may affect IPO forecast reliability: otherwise.
13
We include the control variables in the regression model based on the literature. Prior research considers firm size as a potential factor affecting earnings forecast accuracy. For instance, Hagerman and Ruland (1979) suggest that larger firms can produce more accurate forecasts because they are more diversified and thus are better able to survive economic changes than smaller firms. Cox (1995) argues that larger firms have adequate human resources to prepare high-quality forecasts and a stable earnings process in which earnings
12
For example, the forecast horizon for a firm that went public on 06/14/1997 is 7 months, and the forecast horizon for a firm that went public on 08/16/1996 is 4 months. The fiscal year end is December 31 for all Chinese companies.
13
All continuous variables in the model are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
are more predictable. Larger firms may also have better control over their market settings, and thus may be less susceptible to economic fluctuations (Firth & Smith, 1992) .
It has been argued that an important determinant of forecast reliability is forecast horizon. A negative association between forecast horizon and forecast accuracy is reported in earlier U.S. studies (Collins & Hopwood, 1980; Brown, Foster, & Noreen, 1985) . As earnings forecast is an inherently uncertain process, the longer the forecast horizon the greater the possibility that unexpected events may occur. Additionally, forecasts developed on a date close to the end of the forecast period may incorporate more updated information and thus are more reliable.
Another potential determinant of forecast reliability is past earnings variability. Porter (1982) documents a negative association between past earnings variability and forecast accuracy in the U.S. As past earnings data are usually used as inputs to the forecasting process, it might be more difficult to forecast earnings if past data show a large variation across different years. In addition, the performance of a firm is usually sensitive to local and global market conditions, interest rate movements, exchange rate movements, etc. The effects of these factors on a firm's future performance might be incorporated in past earnings variability (Eddy & Seifert, 1992) .
A firm's financial leverage may also affect its forecast reliability. Clarkson (2000) finds significant evidence that earnings forecasts are less accurate for firms with high leverage in Canada although the results are sensitive to alternative specifications. Eddy and Seifert (1992) suggest that higher leverage may make earnings forecasting more difficult because firms with relatively high debt levels are likely to experience more volatile earnings. Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1998) find that even a modest decline in sales relative to management's expectations is likely to result in a large earnings shortfall for firms with high financial leverage.
IPO earnings forecasts are required to be audited by certified public accountants in China. Simunic and Stein (1987) argue that Big Five accounting firms produce high-quality audits. Big Five firms should have a strong incentive to provide high quality services in order to maintain their good reputations (DeAngelo, 1981; Healy & Lys, 1986 ). Hartnett and
Romcke (2000) and Cheng and Firth (2000) find that auditor quality is positively associated with IPO forecast accuracy in Australia and Hong Kong, respectively. Thus, we include BIG5 in the model. Finally, we add GDP growth rate for the IPO year in the model to control for the effect of general economic conditions on forecast reliability. We also include a stock exchange dummy in the model. To control for fixed industry effects, we include industry dummies in the model.
We expect a positive and significant coefficient on REG for the model with forecast error (FE) as dependent variable if H1 is supported. We also expect a negative and significant coefficient on REG for the model with absolute forecast error (AFE) as dependent variable if H2 is supported. of the forecasts were underestimated. The distribution of forecast errors for Chinese IPO earnings forecasts seems fairly symmetric. About 55% of the sample firms have forecast errors in a range between -10% and +10%, compared to 8% of Australian forecasts (Hartnett, 1993) , 45.97% of Malaysian forecasts (Jelic et al., 1998) , and 4.9% of Jordanian forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 2006) . About 75% of the sample firms have forecast errors in a range between -20% and +20%, compared to 55% of Canadian forecasts (Pedwell et al., 1994) , 19% of New Zealand forecasts (Firth & Smith, 1992) , and 7.3% of Jordanian forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 2006) . Moreover, about 0.8% of the sample firms have forecast errors beyond the range of -100% to +100%, compared to 53% of Australian forecasts (Hartnett, 1993) and 39.0% of Jordanian forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran,
Empirical Results
2006).
Insert Table 2 about here Table 3 about here   Table 3 , panel A also reports that the mean and median forecast error are 1.60% and 0.18%, respectively, after the end of 1996, compared to -1.55% and 0.05%, respectively, before the end of 1996. The mean and median absolute forecast error are 14.46% and 8.31%, respectively, after the end of 1996, compared to 16.72% and 9.89%, respectively, before the end of 1996. In addition, Chen and Firth (1999) find that earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses are more accurate than time series extrapolations of historical earnings.
CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 enhances the credibility of earnings forecasts contained in
Chinese IPO prospectuses.
Insert Table 4 about here Table 4 , panel A tabulates the descriptive statistics on the independent variables used in the regression analysis. Table 4 , panel B reports Pearson correlations among the independent variables. As the correlation between REG and GDP is highly negative (r = -0.76), we first conduct collinearity diagnostics for the regression analysis. We find that the components associated with a high condition index (i.e., greater than 30) do not contribute strongly to the variance of two or more variables (i.e., variance proportion greater than about 0.5). Thus, multicollinearity is not a substantive issue when both REG and GDP are included in the regression model. Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. Table 5, columns 2 and 3 report the results on testing H1. We find that REG is positive and significant (t-statistic = 3.31), consistent with H1. Thus, results from the univariate tests of H1 still hold after adding control variables in the regression model. Our findings suggest that the CSRC Regulation
No. 12-1996 mitigates the overestimation of earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses.
In addition, we find that the coefficient on LEV is significantly negative (t-statistic = -1.61),
suggesting that IPO firms with higher financial leverage issued more optimistic earnings forecasts than IPO firms with lower financial leverage. Insert Table 5 about here
In addition, we find that the coefficient on forecast horizon (FH) is significantly positive (t-statistic = 6.98), consistent with the studies in Canada (Davidson & Neu, 1993; Clarkson, 2000) , New Zealand (Mak, 1989) , the U.K. (Keasey & McGuinness, 1991) , Australia (Hartnett, 1993) , Singapore (Firth et al., 1995) , and Thailand (Lonkani & Firth, 2005) . This finding suggests that Chinese IPO earnings forecasts with shorter horizon are more accurate than those with longer horizon. Also, past earnings variability (PEV) is positively associated with absolute forecast error (t-statistic = 1.96), consistent with a Hong Kong study by Chan et al. (1996) . Thus, Chinese IPO firms with lower past earnings variability issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those with higher past earnings variability. Moreover, we find that financial leverage (LEV) is positively associated with absolute forecast error (t-statistic = 1.82), suggesting that Chinese IPO earnings forecasts with higher financial leverage are less accurate than those with lower financial leverage.
Finally, we document a negative and significant coefficient on retention ownership (RTO) (tstatistic = -1.43), consistent with a Jordanian study by El-Rajabi and Gunasekaran (2006) .
Thus, Chinese IPO earnings forecasts are more accurate for firms with higher ownership retention than for those with lower ownership retention.
Additional Analyses
We also conduct additional analyses as follows. First, we examine whether the results of our regression analysis are sensitive to using alternative measures of forecast bias and accuracy. We consider five different ways to calculate FE and AFE by using (1) absolute actual earnings (Cheng & Firth, 2000) , (2) total assets (Hartnett, 2006) , (3) sales, (4) book value of common equity, or (5) market value of common equity as the denominator in the formulae of FE and AFE, respectively. Table 6 reports the results on the alternative measures of forecast reliability. We find that earnings forecasts have been significantly less optimistic after the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, regardless of which alternative measure is used ( t-statistic = 3.83, 3.49, 2.82, 3.64 , and 2.13, respectively). We also find that forecast accuracy, as measured by one of the five different ways, has been significantly higher after the promulgation of the Regulation (t-statistic =-3.14, -4.45, -3.97, -4.53, and -1.34, respectively). Thus, our results are not sensitive to the use of alternative proxies for forecast reliability.
Insert Table 6 about here Second, we examine whether earnings forecasts being less optimistic after 1996 was due to management's overstatement of ex post earnings realization rather than the impact of the Regulation on management's ex ante forecasting behaviour. As firms will be penalized by the CSRC if their IPO earnings forecasts are overstated, management may feel more pressure to manage IPO year's actual earnings to meet their pre-IPO forecasts. We measure earnings management as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash flow from operations (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003) , and add this measure in eq.
(3) to control for the effects of earnings management on IPO forecast bias and accuracy. We find that REG is positively associated with forecast error and is negatively associated with absolute forecast error (non-tabulated t-statistic = 3.32 and -1.71), consistent with our results reported earlier in the text. In addition, we use actual earnings for the year prior to the IPO instead of actual earnings for the IPO year in computing forecast error. We document that the mean and median forecast error were -11.27% and -13.17%, respectively, in 1997, and were -30.12% and -30.86%, respectively, in 1996. Both t-test and Wilcoxon test show that earnings forecasts were significantly less optimistic in 1997 than in 1996 (non-tabulated tstatistic = 6.42 and z-statistic = 7.67, respectively). These results suggest that the less optimistic IPO earnings forecasts in 1997 were not resulted from management's overstatement of ex post earnings realization to meet their pre-IPO forecasts.
Third, we examine whether earnings forecast being more reliable after the Regulation is confounded by the development of market infrastructure such as the accumulation of investors' knowledge and experience, the development of institutional investors, and the improvement in information disclosure environment. We conduct three tests to address this concern. We first compare forecast reliability for IPOs before 1996 and IPOs in 1996 by estimating eq. (3). We find that forecast bias was not different for the two sub-periods (nontabulated t-statistic = 0.06), whereas IPO earnings forecasts were less accurate in 1996 than before 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = 1.98). These findings suggest that Chinese IPO forecast reliability had not been improved before the promulgation of the Regulation at the end of 1996. We then estimate eq. (3) using IPO forecasts from 1996 and 1997 only.
Compared to the regressions using several years' data, this test is more likely to mitigate confounding effects as there are fewer changes in market infrastructure in a single year than in several years. We find that earnings forecasts were significantly less optimistic in 1997 than in 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = 4.00), although forecast accuracy was not significantly improved in 1997 than in 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = -0.98). To control for the effects of forecast bias, we run regression for absolute forecast error by including forecast error in eq. (3). We find that forecast accuracy was significantly higher in 1997 than in 1996
(non-tabulated t-statistic = -1.87), suggesting that the insignificant change in forecast accuracy from 1996 to 1997 before controlling for forecast error could be due to IPO firms' over-conservative forecasting in 1997. Moreover, we estimate eq. (3) by adding two marketwide variables for each year. Specifically, we use the correlation coefficient between earnings and stock return for all listed firms in each year to reflect changes in information disclosure environment (Frankel, Kothari, & Weber, 2006) . We also use the ratio of market value of common shares held by all institutional investors over the total market capitalization in each year to reflect the development in institutional investors. We find that, consistent with our findings reported earlier, IPO earnings forecasts are less optimistic and more accurate after the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 (non-tabulated tstatistic = 4.37 and -1.40, respectively). Overall, these three tests provide evidence supporting that IPO forecast reliability being more reliable after the Regulation is not confounded by changes in market infrastructure.
Fourth, we examine whether IPO earnings forecasts being less optimistic in 1997 was driven by the Asian Financial Crisis. We compare forecast error for IPOs in 1996 with IPOs in the first half of 1997 as the Asian Financial Crisis started with the collapse of the Thai currency market on July 2, 1997 (Jeon & Seo, 2003 
where UDP is IPO underpricing, measured as first-day closing price minus offer price divided by offer price. REG is coded "1" for IPOs in 1997 and "0" for IPOs in 1996. PRCD is IPO proceeds, computed as the logarithm value of IPO proceeds. ROA is return on assets, measured as net income deflated by total assets. Based on prior research (e.g., Beatty, 1989; Willenborg, 1999; Willenborg & McKeown, 2001) , we include control variables in eq. (4) to control for company size (SIZE), issue size (PRCD), risk (PEV and LEV), auditor reputation (BIG5), retention ownership (RTO), and profitability (ROA). We expect a positive and significant coefficient for REG if IPOs were more underpricing for 1997 than for 1996.
Insert Table 7 about here Table 7 presents results on the changes in IPO underpricing from 1996 to 1997. We find that the coefficient on REG is positive and significant (t-statistic = 1.36). Thus, IPOs were more underpricing for 1997 than for 1996. Our results suggest that managers were less motivated to exaggerate earnings forecasts for setting offer price after the enactment of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996. In addition, we document that IPO underpricing is positively associated with IPO proceeds and audit quality (t-statistic = 6.78 and 3.33, respectively), and is negatively associated with firm size and return on assets (t-statistic = -8.75 and -5.74, respectively).
Conclusion
This study examines whether the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares, can mitigate the overestimation of earnings forecasts and improve forecast accuracy in Chinese IPO prospectuses. We find that IPO earnings forecasts have been less optimistic after the Regulation was promulgated on December 26, 1996. We also find that forecast accuracy has been significantly improved by the Regulation.
Overall, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 can enhance the forecast reliability of IPO earnings forecasts.
Meanwhile, this study provides evidence on the determinants of Chinese IPO forecast accuracy. We find that forecast horizon, past earnings variability, and financial leverage are positively associated with absolute forecast error, and retention ownership is negatively associated with absolute forecast error.
This study has three contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, no other studies in the literature have been conducted to examine the effects of securities administrators' regulations on the reliability of management earnings forecasts.
Second, our findings may provide implications for future regulation promulgation to the CSRC and other securities regulators in emerging markets. Third, this study suggests some ex ante criteria for evaluating Chinese earnings forecast accuracy. 
where F = Earnings forecast, A = Actual earnings. ** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed). * Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed). 0.14*** REG is coded "1" if a firm went public after the end of 1996 and "0" if before the end of 1996. SIZE is measured by the logarithm value of total assets. FH is measured as the number of months between the forecast date and the end of the IPO year. PEV is computed by dividing the standard deviation of earnings across the three years prior to the IPO year by the mean of the three years' earnings. LEV is measured by the total liabilities over the total assets. BIG5 is coded "1" if the auditor is a Big Five firm and "0" otherwise. RTO is the percentage of total equity retained by extant owners after the initial public offering. GDP is Gross Domestic Product growth rate. STE is coded "1" if a firm is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and "0" if listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. *** Significant at the level of 1% (two-tailed). ** Significant at the level of 5% (two-tailed). * Significant at the level of 10% (two-tailed). Tables 2, 3 , and 4. *** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed). ** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed). * Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed). (3) is estimated by using alternative measures of FE and AFE based on the denominator of absolute actual earnings, total assets, sales, book value of common equity, and market value of common equity, respectively, instead of absolute earnings forecast. *** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed). ** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed). * Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed). (2) where UDP is IPO underpricing, measured as first-day closing price minus offer price divided by offer price. REG is coded "1" for IPOs in 1997 and "0" for IPOs in 1996. PRCD is IPO proceeds, computed as the logarithm value of IPO proceeds. ROA is return on assets, measured as net income deflated by total assets. Other variables in eq. (4) are defined in Table 4 . *** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed). ** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed). * Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed).
